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Comment on Trigger’s Manichean 
Dualism 
Rohan Bastin4 
Trigger argues that there are two common themes underlying the critique of applied 
anthropological research in Aboriginal Australia: doubts over its morality and its 
contribution to knowledge. He cites Barry Morris and my (2004) introduction to our 
co-edited work Expert knowledge, as well as a journal article ‘Surrender to the Market: 
Thoughts on Anthropology, the Body Shop, and Intellectuals’ (Bastin 2003), to 
illustrate my involvement in this critique, while supporting his argument against the 
critique by citing an unpublished paper by Lee Sackett. Sackett is also cited for asserting 
that the intellectual rigor of legal testimony is greater than that which is required for 
academic scholarship. I am not certain of the larger applicability of this opinion and, 
more than that, its assertion that expert testimony validated by adversarial crossexamination 
with a view to a defined legal outcome of usually great consequence, albeit 
not necessarily for the expert, should be compared with scholarship—a field that clearly 
entertains diverse products of, as Sackett apparently attests, often dubious quality. At 
any rate, expert testimony in a legal domain represents only a fragment of expert 
knowledge, of which applied anthropology is merely one part. That it is a major feature 
of applied anthropological research in Australia says something about the country, and 
the legal consequences of the legal overthrow of the legal definition of Australia as a 
settled colony: a land ‘empty’ of law that has been and continues to be colonised by an 
excess of law. Trigger’s reflections on his career, specifically concerning the changing 
nature and validity of Aboriginal customary law, illustrate this. Instead of thinking 
about these particularities, however, Trigger conflates them with applied anthropology 
more generally and, at the same time, misses the point that Expert knowledge is also 
about consultancy, and that applied anthropology is not the same thing. In other 
words, he is conflating the part for the whole. 
Contrary to Trigger (and Sackett’s) claims, I do not subscribe to the view that a 
division and separation occurs between pure and applied anthropology. ‘Surrender to 
the Market’ contrasts a piece of applied research, the Seligmanns’ (1911) study of the 
Sri Lankan Veddas, with a study of Nepalese Sherpa tour guides in the nineties by 
Vincanne Adams (1996). Where the Seligmanns searched for ‘pure types’ amidst the 
‘professional primitive men’, Adams celebrates the contemporary equivalents of these 
objects of colonial spectacle in the global tourism market. My contrast is intended to 
highlight the postmodern turn in anthropology as ‘surrender to the market’ (the 
phrase is taken from Fredric Jameson 1991). I am describing the changing nature of 
anthropological complicity with broader social and economic processes, and not a 
dichotomy between pure and applied. I then note the twinned features of, firstly, 
anthropological historicism, particularly in postcolonialism and post-orientalism as 
these relate to the challenges of anthropological factuality raised by the ‘writing culture’ 
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critique; and, secondly, the rise of consultancy where, indeed, facts are challenged 
without factuality itself being challenged. Rather than see these features as pure versus 
applied, fictive versus factual, however, I argue that they reflect the contemporary 
situation for the discipline as a whole; a situation where, to echo Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994), scholarship is replaced by sales promotion and a tremendous collusion is 
occurring between knowledge and the market. Concluding my essay with a discussion 
of the Gramscian (1971) concept of the organic intellectual—what Sartre (1983) called 
the technician of practical knowledge—I ask if anthropologists both inside and outside 
the academy wish to pursue intellectual lives or not. Following Sartre (1983), such 
intellectualism entails a mode of authenticity that necessarily requires constant selfcritique. 
Tenured academic freedom, what Feyerabend (1987, 278) calls ‘the magic 
hood of parasitism’, is no more sheltered from this market than private consultancy, 
and thus no more immune to its orientations. 
Two features of Trigger’s essay provide me with further evidence of that lack of 
immunity. The first is his concern that students reading a book review—Kapferer’s 
(1999) review of Merlan’s Caging the rainbow—will be discouraged from pursuing 
work in Aboriginal Native Title when the industry is crying out for anthropologists. 
The second is the assertion that ‘no evidence of . . . benefit’ (Trigger 2011b, 239) is 
proffered by the critics of applied anthropology to indicate how their research—‘pure 
research’—is somehow better. Regardless of the logical fallacy of imagining the 
impact of a book review set against the supposed uselessness of scholarship, Trigger is 
demonstrating the overdetermining nature of the market by applying a cost-benefit 
analysis to a false dichotomy. In the process, he also belittles students as incapable of 
making up their own minds regarding the forms of employment they will pursue. For 
someone located in Australian academia, caught in the full flush of accountability, 
there is something disturbing about the kinds of power being imagined here. 
In conclusion, I note that at Deakin University a required Honours coursework 
subject focuses on applied anthropology. When I teach the subject, I do not focus only 
on Australia and its legally-overdetermined situation, development in the international 
context, or the health industries with their high numbers of full-time anthropologists. 
Nor do I dwell on the embedded anthropologists in the US military’s Human Terrain 
Initiative in Afghanistan. Instead, I strive to address all of these areas and, by drawing 
upon anthropology’s greatest strength, its comparativism, I alert students to the issues 
and debates surrounding the possible fields of work they may encounter in their 
professional lives. What they do is, of course, up to them, just as what my colleagues 
teach when they take the subject is up to them. I make no apologies for my theoretical 
and ideological persuasions in this regard, merely lament that increasingly small 
programs in Australian universities reflect narrower and narrower points of view. In 
other words, we are all becoming overdetermined by changing market forces. Some of 
us, however, seem to be less aware of that than others and are thus more organic to or 
embedded within the larger apparatus. This is not a matter of relative purity, but a 
matter of knowledge of oneself in one’s situation and the dangers of ressentiment 
deriving from imagined adversaries in dualistic (Manichean) worlds. While I welcome 
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Trigger’s intervention, I am disappointed that he sees the debate in such simplistically 
dichotomous and, above all, parochial terms. This is not simply a problem for applied 
anthropology, but for an increasingly overdetermined Australian anthropology. 
